I seek to identify the specific nature of Schelling’s transcendental philosophy in the System of Transcendental Idealism. This transcendental philosophy implements two moments: a ‘transcendentalization of nature’ (containing the ‘real series’ as an expression of the ‘ideal series’) and the ‘self-objectification of the subject.’ In particular, it has to fulfill three tasks: unify (teleologically) theoretical and practical philosophy, specify the method of philosophy in relation to that of mathematics, and clarify the meaning of ‘construction.’ I then turn to the position that Schelling developed in his correspondence with Fichte, highlighting the ‘objective subject-object’ as the highest unity of the philosophy of nature and transcendental philosophy. This leads me to a discussion of what, if anything, of Schelling’s transcendental philosophy can reach us today in light of contemporary criticisms of philosophies of the subject, criticisms that argue they are unable to give a robust enough notion of reality.