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Y a-t-il une « révolution copernicienne » ou « anticopernicienne » en phénoménologie (en partant du débat entre Husserl et Kant) ? !
Journal
META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY
Date Issued
2016
Abstract
This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and
Dominique Pradelle (in particular) – if and how phenomenology deals with an
“anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially
Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some
modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the
subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the
Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather
opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take
place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a
pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the
alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an
“idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental
method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a
constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an
ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis
of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws
upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.
Dominique Pradelle (in particular) – if and how phenomenology deals with an
“anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially
Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some
modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the
subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the
Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather
opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take
place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a
pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the
alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an
“idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental
method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a
constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an
ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis
of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws
upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.
