Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Publication
    Ereignis and Da-Sein in the Beiträge zur Philosophie
    This contribution seeks to clarify the status of Ereignis and Dasein in the Beiträge zur Philosophie and to question, in particular, the relationship between these two concepts. The angle that will be preferred here is that of the discussion with transcendentalism (starting with Kant). The author defends the thesis that there is an alteration in the meaning of " Dasein " between Sein und Zeit and the Beiträge zur Philosophie, having repercussions on the relationship between " Seyn " and " Da-sein " . At the very heart of this new meaning of Da-sein in the Beiträge stands the conception of an " out-standing standing-within " (ausstehendes Innestehen) that must be analyzed in detail.
      42
  • Publication
    Y a-t-il une « révolution copernicienne » ou « anticopernicienne » en phénoménologie (en partant du débat entre Husserl et Kant) ?
    This paper raises the question – based on the works of Marc Richir and Dominique Pradelle (in particular) – if and how phenomenology deals with an “anti-Copernican” revolution, considering that the motif (which is initially Kantian) of a “Copernican” revolution seems to have gone through some modifications that reflect a certain deposition of the constitutive role of the subject. Its fundamental thesis is that a certain dimension “beyond” the Copernican revolution does not reestablish a “Ptolemaic” realism but rather opens a dimension “beneath”: beneath the subject and the object where can take place a mutual relationship between an a-subjective constitutive power and a pre-empirical foundational being. This dimension “beneath” means that the alternative does not concern a “pre-Copernican” realism on the one hand and an “idealism” leaving in the shadows the relationship between the transcendental method and an ontological perspective on the other, but rather puts forward a constructive circularity between the transcendental constitution and an ontological foundation. It follows that “normativity” is not achieved on the basis of pre-given objectivity – because it would mean a petition principia – but draws upon the “pre-immanent generativity”.
      49